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A Neo-Institutional Explanation of State Supreme Court  
Responses in Search and Seizure Cases  
The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is more complicated than it 
may appear at first glance.  In order to better understand this relationship, we examine 
how Supreme Court precedent affects state supreme court decision-making.  Toward this 
end, we investigate whether and how Supreme Court precedent impacts lower court 
decisions.  Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and seizure, we 
specifically test hypotheses about how state judicial context and Supreme Court behavior 
influences when the lower court is likely to be affected by Supreme Court precedent.  We 
address the nature of state supreme court responses to Supreme Court precedent in search 
and seizure cases decided between 1983 and 1993.  We find that there is substantial 
variation in the responses to precedent by state supreme courts.  Specifically, we find that 
precedent does have a substantial influence on the behavior of state supreme court 
justices, but judicial ideology and the level of historical conflict between the Supreme 
Court and the state supreme court are also important in understanding the dissemination 
of precedent to the states.  Most interestingly, the effect of judicial retention methods on 
the application of precedent are considerable.
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Introduction 
 There exists a diverse body of research on how lower courts are impacted by 
Supreme Court precedent (Beiser 1968; Benesh and Reddick 2002; Gruhl 1980; Johnson 
1979; Klein and Hume 2003; Emmert and Traut 1994; Hoekstra 2005; Romans 1974).  
To the extent that state supreme courts have been the subject of such work, the findings 
suggest that they are attentive to precedent but vary notably in their application of the 
Court’s decisions.  At times, Supreme Court precedent appears to have a tangible 
influence on the outcomes of the decisions of state supreme court justices, while in other 
contexts the ideology of the justices or state level political factors serve to mitigate the 
power of precedent. 
 The relationship between the Supreme Court and lower courts is therefore more 
complicated than it may appear at first glance.  In order to better understand this 
relationship, we examine the impact of Supreme Court precedent on state supreme court 
decision-making.  Examining state supreme court decisions in the area of search and 
seizure, we assess how state judicial context and Supreme Court precedent influences 
how state courts respond to the precedent they cite.  Our findings suggest that the judicial 
retention system and the degree of Supreme Court monitoring of the state supreme court 
are of primary importance in understanding the responses of state supreme court justices 
to Supreme Court precedent.  Specifically, justices in merit retention states are more 
attentive to precedent of the Supreme Court than justices in either elite or competitive 
election systems. 
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The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Lower Courts 
 Judicial decision-makers are influenced by a complex array of factors, including their 
own preferences (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000; Segal and Spaeth 2002) and the political 
environment (Epstein and Knight 2000; Maltzman, Spriggs, and Wahlbeck 2000).  But 
the decisions of other courts, especially higher courts, are also important.  Partly this is 
because precedent is a guide for how to make decisions in the presence of specific fact 
patterns (Emmert 1992; Emmert and Traut 1994; George and Epstein 1992; Segal 1984, 
1986; Segal and Spaeth 2002).  It is also because precedent is a normative guide for 
lower courts, especially in cases with novel fact pact patterns (Knight and Epstein 1996; 
Landes and Posner 1976; Hansford and Spriggs 2006; Wahlbeck 1997).  
 Nevertheless, there is considerable debate about the ability of higher courts to get 
lower courts to adhere to their decisions.  Much of the work on the role of precedent 
focuses on the hierarchical nature of the federal court system, analyzing how the lower 
court’s political preferences interact with the Supreme Court’s limited ability to monitor 
them to produce variations in lower court behavior (Benesh and Reddick 2001; Dickson 
1994; Gruhl 1980, 1981; Johnson 1979; Romans 1974; Tarr 1977; Wasby 1970).  Recent 
research on the federal circuit courts indicates that the Supreme Court’s limited ability to 
hear cases affects both which courts they tend to review (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 
2000) and the extent to which lower court justices “shirk” in order to pursue their own 
policy interests (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; but see also Cross 2005). 
 To what extent do these conclusions apply to state supreme courts?  Does Supreme 
Court precedent effect the decisions of state justices?  Or, are their own political 
preferences more important, behaving as if they are not subject to the Supreme Court’s 
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authority?  Do state judicial institutions affect their susceptibility to monitoring by the 
Supreme Court?  The answers to these questions are not clear, primarily because the 
relationship between state courts and the Supreme Court is not strictly hierarchical.  That 
is, not all decisions handed down by the state supreme courts are liable to Supreme Court 
review.  This means that, in addition to factors that may allow all lower courts to avoid 
implementing decisions of the Supreme Court, state supreme courts can also rely on their 
own state constitutions and laws to determine the outcome of a case when issues of 
federal law are not implicated.  Such reasoning indicates that the United State Supreme 
Court should have no more than a limited effect on the behavior of these courts. 
 But this is not necessarily the case.  First, Supreme Court precedent might be a useful 
strategic tool for state judicial actors who are seeking to justify unpopular decisions for 
state voters and elites.  Since a large majority of state supreme court justices are not 
lifetime appointees and are therefore subordinates in local state political hierarchies, their 
specialized knowledge of Supreme Court precedent may allow them to “shirk” locally.  
Second, state supreme courts are not entirely independent of the Supreme Court because 
many matters that come before them potentially implicate federal law.  Accordingly, they 
still have some relationship with the Supreme Court and its decisions.  Third, the 
Supreme Court itself has an interest in maintaining its own authority to review state 
decisions and using that to affect policy change on a broader scale.  For instance, Justice 
O’Connor, writing for the majority in Michigan v. Long, argued that the Court would 
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assume that decisions of state supreme courts implicated federal law unless explicitly 
stated otherwise in the opinion.1   
 Empirical research does not resolve these conflicting expectations.  Although state 
supreme courts enjoy certain latitude, their decisions are still shaped by Supreme Court 
precedent (see Cannon 1973, 1974).  For example, Hoekstra’s (2005) study of minimum 
wage law from the early part of the 20th century shows that Supreme Court decisions 
substantially influence the probability state courts overturn challenges to state laws.  
Conversely, other work on state supreme courts suggests that institutional arrangements, 
case facts, and judicial preferences are also influential.  Brace and Hall have 
demonstrated that state level institutions affect the decisions of state supreme courts 
(Brace and Hall 1990, 1993, 1997; Hall and Brace 1989, 1992, 1994).  Clearly state 
supreme court justices work in an environment with a wide array of legal and institutional 
pressures (see Langer 2002).  We expect that these forces – both legal and electoral – will 
affect the choices made by state supreme court justices in search and seizure cases.  Our 
goal here is to expand on these themes by systematically exploring how these state 
conditions predicate the influence of Supreme Court precedent. 
Theoretical Framework 
 The use of Supreme Court precedent by state supreme courts is complicated by the 
difficulty state judges have in reconciling state and federal law.  Previous studies of 
Supreme Court/Circuit Court of Appeals interactions relies in large part on principal-
agent theory to explain the dissemination of Supreme Court precedent among those 
courts (Songer, Segal, and Cameron 1994; Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000; 
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Westerland, Segal, Epstein, Comparato, and Cameron 2006).  Yet this may not be the 
most appropriate lens through which to monitor the relationship between the Supreme 
Court and state supreme courts.  Though the Supreme Court has substantial power to 
review state courts, the relationship is not strictly hierarchical for reasons discussed 
above.  Unlike judges on lower federal courts, state supreme courts are also embedded in 
state political environments that include other actors with the ability to influence their 
decisions.  Governors, state legislatures, and the public have means at their disposal to 
alter policy in response to the written decisions of state supreme courts, the most 
important of which is the ability to remove judicial decision-makers from office.  It is 
those arrangements that constrain the decision making process of state supreme court 
justices further complicating their relationship with the Supreme Court. 
 Because state supreme court justices are motivated to retain their position, they 
behave in a manner to minimize the risk of removal.  As a result, they must concern 
themselves not only with the probability that their decisions may be reviewed and 
overturned by the Supreme Court, but must also be mindful of the local political context.  
This is not to suggest that state supreme court justices are simply instruments of state 
level actors with the power to retain those judges, but it does have profound implications 
for understanding how state supreme courts make us of Supreme Court precedent.  We 
wholly expect that other factors, such as their own policy goals, will affect their 
decisions.  However, because most state justices do not enjoy life tenure we expect the 
structure of their seat retention incentives to also be influential.   
 This orientation focuses our attention on the institutional arrangements that determine 
how state justices maintain their position.  While we consider it axiomatic that they wish 
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to avoid reversal by the Supreme Court, local political pressures may create situations in 
which following such precedent might put them in jeopardy of staying on their court.  
Specifically, the fact that the states use different methods for retaining state supreme 
court justices leads us to expect that the constraints imposed by these institutional 
differences will generate different responses to Supreme Court precedent.  They will 
behave in a risk averse manner, minimizing the negative electoral consequences of their 
decisions while in the pursuit of their most preferred policy outcome.   
 Related to this issue of risk avoidance is the question of monitoring.  Most decisions 
of state supreme court justices are unknown to the electorate.  For state supreme court 
justices the more relevant, and potentially harmful, monitoring comes from the state 
political elites.  These actors (governor or legislature) are more likely to be aware of the 
decisions of the state supreme court, and whether their decisions have been reviewed and 
overturned by the Supreme Court.  Because political elites are more likely to be 
interested in, and informed about, the actions of the state supreme court we expect them 
to exercise closer scrutiny of justices than will state electorates.  Within systems that elect 
judges, we further expect those in competitive systems to more closely monitored than 
those in retention systems. 
 These local monitoring differences hold different implications for state judges.  First, 
in elite retention systems the main impact of the Supreme Court ought to be through fact 
patterns and not policy.  This is because elites have more clear power over state supreme 
court justices, as well as better knowledge of their decisions.  Second, in electoral 
systems, monitoring by the electorate should be low enough that judges have 
considerable latitude in how to make decisions (see Baum 1983, 1987; Dubois 1979; 
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Sheldon and Lovrich 1983).  More importantly, the low level of monitoring implies that 
they should be relatively safe and secure as long as they do not engage in behavior that 
alerts the public.2  We conjecture that a prominent way for this to occur is by engaging in 
protracted contract with the Supreme Court because that is likely to draw the attention of 
the media and opinion leaders.   
 Finally, the presence of potential competitors in some electoral systems ought to also 
produce some variations in judicial behavior.  Even as we expect judges in those systems 
to be risk averse and generally wanting to avoid conflict with the Supreme Court, the 
possibility of facing competition – even if rare – means that they must be in a position to 
defend their decisions to an electorate concerned with more than just judicial merit.  
Since the Supreme Court traditionally has more power to set a floor, rather than a ceiling, 
in civil liberties cases, that provides these justices with political cover when citing liberal 
precedent.  Consequently, we expect conflict with the Supreme Court to produce 
responsiveness to liberal precedent, but not to conservative precedent.  In merit systems, 
the absence of competitors to point out the policy impact of judicial decisions implies an 
opposite effect – all that matters is to avoid calling attention to oneself.  As such, conflict 
with the Supreme Court ought to produce responsiveness to both liberal and conservative 
precedent. 
 Although the state supreme court justices’ motivations, and the Supreme Court’s 
limited control over state courts, should limit the impact of Supreme Court precedent on 
state decisions, we argue that monitoring by the Supreme Court still matters.  What 
differs from the Court’s monitoring of federal courts is that its impact depends upon the 
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political position of the state court.  When ignoring the Supreme Court benefits the lower 
court’s ability to signal their quality to the appropriate decision makers at the state level, 
we wholly expect them to ignore precedent.  However, there may be situations where 
conflict with the Court draws unwanted attention and increases the risk of retention for 
state justices, thus creating a situation where they may be more willing to follow 
precedent.  The question, of course, is when monitoring by the Supreme Court interacts 
with local monitoring to create a situation in which they follow precedent. 
Data and Variables 
 
 Sample.  In order to test these hypotheses, we analyze a sample of state supreme court 
cases that cite orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court 
between the 1983 and 1993 terms.  We choose to analyze search and seizure cases 
because 1.) the likelihood of progeny existing in every state is high, and 2.) it has 
remained a relatively constant part of the Supreme Court’s docket.  Additionally, using 
search and seizure cases allows us to test for judicial impact in a traditional area of state 
responsibility (Baum 1978).   
 We first identified all orally argued search and seizure cases decided by the Supreme 
Court between the 1983 and 1993 terms – a total of 63 cases.3  For each of these Supreme 
Court cases, we used Shepard’s Citations to compile a list of every decision in a state 
court of last resort in which it was cited for the years 1983-1995.  This creates a 
population of progeny from which we randomly selected 974 cases – approximately 
thirty-one percent of all state supreme court cases citing these Supreme Court decisions – 
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on which to gather further data.  These progeny serve as our primary unit of analysis.4  
Using this approach provides a large number of relevant state supreme court cases and 
identifies those cases of most interest to our research questions – those that cite Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 Although expedient, this methodology has recognizable limits.  First, this sampling 
approach potentially overstates the impact of Supreme Court precedent by not including 
cases which fail to cite precedent.  The primary means of addressing this is by limiting 
our conclusions to the appropriate progeny, keeping in mind that a broader statement of 
the Court’s impact on the states requires us to model the selection process.  Second, state 
supreme courts cite Supreme Court precedent that they do not directly deal with in their 
own decision.  For example, if a lower court disagrees with a specific decision of the 
Supreme Court, they may bury the reference to that offending precedent amongst a 
number of other cases cited in an attempt to evade the holding of that case.  In other 
words, they may not be addressing cited precedent in any depth.   
 To address this second issue, we coded for the total number of citations in the 
progeny and the length of the citation string where the generating Supreme Court case 
was found.5  Over 70% of the progeny contain only one citation to a Supreme Court 
decision, and only two cases are cited in nearly 90% of the progeny.  Our data also 
suggest that state courts do not “bury” references in a string of cases.  In approximately 
65% of the progeny, the Supreme Court precedent is cited alone, and it is joined by a 
                                                 
14 Texas and Oklahoma have two courts that serve as the court of last resort, one for civil procedures and 
one for criminal matters.  Since we were dealing with search and seizure cases, we only examined progeny 
in the Oklahoma Criminal Court of Appeals and the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. 
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second case in only 21% of the progeny.  We take this as evidence that the Supreme 
Court precedents we use to generate our sample are central to the case under 
consideration by the progeny.  We believe this to be fairly compelling evidence that state 
supreme court justices recognize the relevance of the Supreme Court precedent, rely on it 
in their opinions, and appear to make little effort to obfuscate the fact that it is pertinent 
to the case at hand.  This makes us feel more confident that our data gathering approach 
yields a set of cases and measures that are germane to the issue of state supreme court 
compliance. 
 Variables.  Following other work in the field, our dependent variable is a 
dichotomous measure of whether the state court ruled in favor of the government (coded 
“1”) or the individual (coded “0”).  Our hypotheses point to three different types of 
independent variables that should affect this variable – measures of case facts, judicial 
political preferences, and institutional constraints.  To evaluate the normative effects of 
Supreme Court precedent, we include a variable that captures the degree to which the 
factual circumstances of the state supreme court decisions mirror conditions determined 
as important in Supreme Court precedent writ large.  Following Segal (1984), we first 
measure the presence of seven different facts in search and seizure cases.6  For each of 
these, the Supreme Court has previously established the validity of police searches in its 
presence.  Our variable is a count of how many of these are present in the progeny case.  
The logic of this measure is straightforward – when a case before a state supreme court 
strongly overlaps with existing Supreme Court precedent, the likelihood that the state 
court upholds a search is higher.  Including this measure allows us to better evaluate the 
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political impact of cited precedent by controlling for both its normative effects and its 
usefulness to state court decision-makers. 
 We measure the political preferences of judicial actors in a manner similar to 
previous studies in the field.  First, we do not explicitly measure the predilections of the 
Supreme Court.  Between 1983 and 1993, the mean ideology score on the Supreme Court 
is always conservative, though it does shift slightly to the right in 1986 with Rehnquist 
replacing Burger as chief justice, and the appointment of Scalia to the Court.  Because it 
is a relative constant throughout the course of our sample, it is not explicitly incorporated 
into our analyses.7  We do include a measure of the precedent’s direction in order to 
gauge its policy impact (see Hoekstra 2005).  This measure is coded one if the Supreme 
Court ruled in favor of the government and zero otherwise.  Assuming that state courts 
mainly cite relevant precedent, then this variable should increase the likelihood of a 
similar decision at the state level, ceteris paribus, if it has an impact on the lower court 
(Hoekstra 2005).   We measure the ideology of state supreme court justices using PAJID 
scores (Brace, Langer, and Hall 2000).  Specifically, the variable is the median PAJID 
score for state supreme courts by year over the 1983 – 1995 period.8  This is an interval 
measure with a range from zero (highly conservative) to one hundred (highly liberal).9 
 Finally, our design includes measures of the institutional constraints faced by state 
supreme courts.  Supreme Court monitoring is measured with two variables.  The first is 
the importance of the case to the Supreme Court, measured as the number of search and 
seizure cases decided by the Supreme Court in the three years leading up to the state 
supreme court decision (Cameron, Segal, and Songer 2000).  The second gauges conflict 
between the Supreme Court and the state supreme court by coding the number of times 
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that the Supreme Court has reversed that state supreme court on any issue in the previous 
five years.  State institutional constraints are measured with a trichotomous variable that 
distinguishes states with retention elections, competitive elections, and appointive 
systems.  Information on state judicial retention systems comes from The Book of the 
States (2003). 
 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are reported in Table 1.  With 
these data we are able to evaluate our hypotheses about lower court decision-making in 
ways that have not yet been attempted.  Unlike other studies, that focus on a relatively 
small number of cases in a single issue area for a few courts (see Beavers and Walz 1998; 
Beiser 1968; Cross and Tiller 1998; Dickson 1994; Gruhl 1981; Romans 1974; Smith and 
Tiller 2002), we are able to evaluate how all state supreme courts address decisions of the 
Supreme Court.  In the following section, we discuss the results from these models. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Levels of Impact 
 Does the Supreme Court affect the direction of state supreme court decisions through 
precedent?  As a first cut at this question, we look at the simplest – but most 
straightforward – piece of evidence.  Table 2 shows the overall distribution of progeny by 
the direction of both the cited precedent and the state supreme court decision.  If state 
supreme courts simply do what the Supreme Court suggests, we would expect all of the 
observations to fall into the two impact categories.  On the other hand, if state supreme 
courts purposely (and unrealistically) do not follow the decisions of the Supreme Court, 
then the cases would fall into the remaining categories. 
[Table 2 about here] 
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 There is at least partial evidence here that state supreme courts make decisions 
consistent with Supreme Court precedent.  Eighty percent of the progeny cited Supreme 
Court precedent that favored government, essentially protecting the authority of the 
police to gather evidence.  This is not surprising considering the fact that the Court was 
consistently conservative for the time period under examination, though it does suggest a 
certain amount of cross-level judicial impact.  Also consistent with legal depictions of 
judicial hierarchy, 55% of all progeny decided on behalf of the same party as the 
Supreme Court precedent it cited.  This level of judicial consensus is a testimony to the 
centrifugal pull of the decisions of the Supreme Court. 
 However, there is also substantial evidence that state supreme courts are making 
decisions based on other factors.  In 45% of the cases, the state-level decision favors a 
different actor than the cited Supreme Court precedent, a non-negligible proportion of 
cases.  Among the four possible combinations, the second most frequent category (33%) 
occurs when states restrict the government’s authority while citing a Supreme Court case 
that does the opposite.  The high frequency of this behavior probably reflects, in part, 
liberal state courts distinguishing themselves from the conservative Supreme Court of 
this era.  However, it is also undoubtedly reflects the fact that the Supreme Court can set 
a floor, but not a ceiling, on individual liberties.  Buttressing this point is that in only 12% 
of the cases does the state favor the government actor while citing a liberal Supreme 
Court case.   
 Are these patterns related to variations in state context?  Table 3 shows the 
distribution of cases and outcomes in the fifty states.  As this table makes clear, there is 
substantial variation in the potential impact of Supreme Court precedent on state 
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behavior, though the small sample sizes require us to view the point estimates with 
skepticism.  Some states, such as Delaware, Iowa, Maine, and Mississippi, cite precedent 
that is pro-government and generally make the same decision.  Other states, such as 
California and Pennsylvania, consistently rule in favor of individuals while citing pro-
government precedent.  In still other states like Idaho and Virginia, progeny are more 
evenly distributed in each of the four categories.  The key point is that there is substantial 
variation across the states in the relationship between precedent and state supreme court 
decisions. 
[Table 3 about here] 
 These data hold important insights into the working of our judicial system.  
Importantly, there is evidence that the Supreme Court can effectively set a floor through 
precedent, evidenced by the relatively infrequent appearance of pro-government 
decisions citing pro-individual precedent.  But legalistic explanations of the judicial 
hierarchy do not seem capable of explaining state-by-state variations.  If Supreme Court 
precedent has strong normative value we should not observe strong and systematic levels 
of variation across the states.  Conversely, if the state courts are fundamentally free from 
Supreme Court influences, we would expect a random distribution of cases in the four 
categories across states.  Instead, we see strong cross-state differences that are at least 
superficially related to the political factors.  For example, the patterns of impact in Table 
3 are consistent with the idea of conflict between a conservative Supreme Court and at 
least a handful of more liberal state courts that choose to extend individual liberties 
further.  Although these results are interesting, they do not explain – under what political 
and institutional circumstances Supreme Court precedent influences state supreme court 
  15
decisions. 
Predicting the Outcomes of Progeny 
 The next step in our analysis is to model the outcomes of individual progeny as a 
function of case characteristics, judicial political preferences, and institutional 
constraints.  Since our dependent variable is dichotomous (1 = decision in favor of state, 
0 = decision in favor of individual), we use a logit model to estimate the impact of each 
independent variable on the probability that the state supreme court rules in favor of the 
government.  To account for possible dependencies among cases decided in the same 
state, we employ clustered standard errors by state.  Given that our theoretical framework 
predicts that state judicial institutions determine its responsiveness to policy influence of 
Supreme Court precedent, we separate our data into different samples by judicial 
retention method – Elite Retention, Competitive Election, and Retention (Merit) Election.  
The results are reported in Table 4. 
[Table 4 about here] 
 Looking the three sets of results, some interesting patterns emerge.  In all three 
systems, case facts have a statistically significant and positive effect.  Simply stated, state 
court decisions in cases that overlap significantly with fact patterns identified by the 
Supreme Court as legitimate situations for warrantless searches are more likely to favor 
the government.  This result is entirely consistent with the normative view of the judicial 
hierarchy – that justices are attentive to the facts of the case before them.  Of note is that 
the size of the case facts variables is twice as large in the Elite Selection model as it is in 
the Competitive Election model; it is 50% larger than the coefficient in the Retention 
Election model.  Interestingly, the results also show that court ideology is only 
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statistically significant in merit systems.  In both the Elite Selection and Competitive 
Election models, the coefficient is statistically insignificant.   
 More central to the questions identified in this paper are the coefficients 
associated with the direction of cited Supreme Court precedent, the level of conflict 
between the Supreme Court and state court, and the interaction of these two variables.  
Because of the interaction term, the standard errors reported in the table do not provide us 
with complete information on the significance of these three variables (Friedrich 1982).  
Nevertheless, there are some interesting differences between the results in different 
institutional settings.  Most importantly, in elite selection systems, the baseline impact of 
Supreme Court precedent is higher than it is in either of the electoral systems.  What this 
means is that, in the absence of any reversals there is a greater tendency toward impact in 
the elite systems than in electoral systems.10  Conversely, in electoral systems the impact 
of precedent is more clearly dependant upon the actions of the Supreme Court, a fact 
reflected in the somewhat larger coefficients associated with frequency of reversal and 
the interaction term. 
 While we reserve our full discussion of these results for the next section, the 
statistical results provide the foundation for some interesting conclusions.  Foremost 
among them is that, no matter the institutional or political circumstances faced by state 
justices, they respond to the broad normative constraints established by Supreme Court 
precedent.  This is consistent with arguments that 1) the Supreme Court sets a floor for 
the states on civil liberties issues, and; 2) legal norms are important for establishing 
coherency throughout the judiciary.  Beyond this, we find that political factors still matter 
a great deal, though the manner and extent to which they matter depends upon the local 
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institutions for selecting and retaining justices.  In particular, it appears that judges in 
states with electoral systems are more responsive to the specific political predilections 
ensconced in precedent when they have been susceptible to the higher courts intervention 
in recent years. 
Substantive Effects 
 To get a better understanding of how Supreme Court precedent impacts state 
decisions in different settings, we show the impact of our variables on the probability that 
the state court favors the government in its decision.  Using the coefficient values from 
Table 4 and holding all other variables at their means (not including interaction 
coefficients), we first focus on the effects of frequency of reversal.11  In doing so, we 
compute probabilities for courts that are relatively liberal, moderate, and conservative.12  
Finally, we engage in this exercise for Supreme Court precedent that is both pro-
individual (labeled as “Liberal” in the graph) and pro-government (labeled as 
“Conservative”) Supreme Court precedent. 
 Figure 1 shows the impact of frequency of reversal in elite systems.  Two things stand 
out in this graph.  Foremost is that the impact of frequency of reversal is to always reduce 
the probability that a state wins.  Although this is not inconsistent with our theoretical 
expectations, we can offer no clear explanation within our framework either.  It would 
seem that these courts see all conflict with the Supreme Court as encouraging them to pay 
attention to the floor, but we cannot convincingly demonstrate the veracity of this claim.  
Additionally, we see that judicial ideology has next-to-no impact on state judicial 
decisions in these systems.  Indeed, the lines for conservative, moderate, and liberal 
courts are indistinguishable.  
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[Figure 1 about here] 
 Figure 2 repeats this exercise for states that use competitive elections.   Regardless of 
the direction of the cited Supreme Court precedent, conservative state courts are always 
more likely to rule in favor of the government and liberal courts in favor of individuals.  
This confirms the importance of state judicial institutions for creating situations in which 
judicial actors can consume their own ideological preferences, though the effect is not 
very strong. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 What we see in these graphs is a striking difference based upon the direction of the 
cited Supreme Court precedent.  When it is conservative – that is, it establishes a ceiling 
– state courts typically have at least a 70% probability of also making a conservative 
decision.   A similar picture emerges when state courts cite liberal Supreme Court 
decisions – those that establish a floor.  Keeping in mind that these state courts are 
susceptible to close monitoring by state political actors, the states are less likely to win if 
they have been reversed recently.  Regardless of the ideology of the state supreme court 
court’s ideology, the probability of a pro-government decision is around 70%  If we 
assume that governors and legislatures do not want high profile criminal cases to be 
overturned, this seems like a reasonable result.  However, as the Supreme Court becomes 
more involved through overturning the states, it can effectively enforce its floor.  For 
states that have been overturned five or more times, the probability of a pro-government 
decision drops below the 50% line for both liberal and conservative precedent. 
 Also of interest here is that, despite the fact that state court political preferences are 
substantively important, the Supreme Court is still capable of encouraging lower courts to 
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comply with its pro-individual decisions.  There is more resistance in these systems to 
conservative precedent, witnessed by the fact that  state courts regardless of ideology do 
not alter their behavior in the face of numerous reversals.  This is entirely in keeping with 
the idea that the federal constitution sets a floor for individual rights and that states are 
free to afford greater protections.  When justices in competitive election states cite liberal 
Supreme Court precedent the probability of the state winning is over 80%, but as they are 
increasingly reversed by the Supreme Court, the states probability of winning drops 
quickly.   
 In Figure 3, we present the results of the impact of frequency of reversal on state 
judicial behavior in merit retention systems.  Here the substantive results are most 
striking.  In these states, when justices cite liberal decisions of the Supreme Court, the 
state has a near 80% probability of winning, but by five reversals, that probability has 
declined below 20%.  When citing conservative precedent, regardless of state judicial 
ideology, the justices are more likely to vote conservatively as the frequency of reversal 
by the Supreme Court increases.  These results are clear examples of the effect of judicial 
ideology exerting a substantive impact on the outcome – we see justices instrumentally 
responding to cited precedent on the bases of how frequently they conflict with the 
Supreme Court.  This is consistent with our arguments about risk aversion. 
[Figure 3 about here] 
 Lastly, in Figure 4, we present evidence of the substantive importance of case facts on 
state supreme court behavior.  Traditional concepts of precedent suggest that as the case 
facts in the extant case before a justice more closely resemble those in a previously 
decided case, the influence of that precedent increases.  Here we see clear evidence that 
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the precedent is not treated similarly by justices across retention methods, further 
confirming our earlier claims that the normative and political impact of precedent 
depends upon the state judicial institutions. 
[Figure 4 about here] 
 In elite retention systems, the power of precedent is evident.  When citing liberal 
decisions of the Supreme Court the probability that the state wins rises at approximately 
the same rate as the number of case facts increases regardless of the rate of reversal, 
suggesting that justices in those states are responding, not to the ‘sanction’ being meted 
by the Supreme Court, but are, in fact, responding to the facts of the case.13  That changes 
slightly for justices in competitive election states where recent reversal by the Supreme 
Court does appear to exert an influence on the probability of the state winning.  However, 
the most striking findings arise when viewing the impact of case facts in merit retention 
states.  Here the effect of Supreme Court reversals on the state is substantial.  Where the 
state court has not been reversed the probability of the state winning is close to 50%, 
increasing to over 90% by the time they reach six similar case facts.  Conversely, where 
the state has been reversed recently, the probability of the state winning is less than 20%, 
but that increases to just over 50% of the time when six facts are present.  This provides 
substantial support for the conclusion that in merit retention states, justices are behaving 
in a risk averse manner to achieve their policy goals within the constraints placed on 
them by the Supreme Court. 
Conclusion 
 The results presented here have important theoretical and substantive implications for 
understanding the relationship between the Supreme Court and state supreme courts, but 
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also for interpreting the importance of judicial retention methods and compliance with 
precedent.  Our results provide evidence that runs counter to the arguments forwarded by 
policy makers interested in reforming state judicial retention methods.  Justices in elite 
retention systems respond to Supreme Court precedent most like how traditional legal 
scholarship suggests that lower court judges should behave – precedent serves an 
instructional purpose and state supreme court justices in those states evince a clear 
pattern of following Supreme Court precedent regardless of ideology.  In effect, despite 
being chosen and retained by the legislature or governor of the state, these judges behave 
most like we expect judges to behave. 
 State supreme court justices in competitive and merit retention states behave quite 
differently, with (surprisingly) merit retention justices resisting Supreme Court precedent 
and only grudgingly altering their decisions to conform to precedent when they are 
reversed by the Supreme Court.  This runs counter to arguments suggesting that merit 
systems produce ‘better’ judges.  If better means those less able (or willing) to vote their 
policy preferences, regardless of existing Supreme Court precedent, then the results here 
cast some doubt on that perspective.  This research points out the complex relationship 
between state supreme courts and the Supreme Court and illuminates the importance of 
institutional arrangements in understanding the dissemination of precedent to the states. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics.  This table shows the mean, standard deviation, range, 
and number of observations for the main variables in the progeny-level dataset.   
 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum
 
Maximum N
 
Direction of 
State Court 
Decision 
 
 
0.59 0.49 0
 
1 959
 
Direction of 
Supreme 
Court 
Precedent 
 
 
0.80 0.40 0
 
1 974
 
Mean PAJID 
Score of 
State Court 
 
 
49.36 19.50 8.18
 
85.98 974
 
Frequency 
of State 
Supreme 
Court 
Reversal 
 
 
1.99 2.01 0
 
9 973
 
Salience of 
Search and 
Seizure 
 
 
18.14 8.29 2
 
32 972
 
Electoral 
Method of 
Retention 
 
 
0.74 0.44 0
 
1 974
 
Case Facts 
 
2.70 0.98 0
 
6 758
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Table 2.  State Supreme Court Compliance with Supreme Court Precedent, 1983-
1995.  This table displays the proportion of decisions from state courts of last resort that 
are decided consistent with the Supreme Court case they cite.  The results show that for 
the 1983-1995 time period, the two most frequent outcomes were pro-government 
consistency and pro-individual inconsistency. 
 
 
 
State Decision 
 
U.S. Supreme Court Decision 
 
Label 
 
Percent 
 
 
Favor Government 
 
Favor Government 
 
Pro-Government 
Impact 
 
   47% 
  (452)   
 
 
Favor Government 
 
Favor Individual 
 
Pro-Government 
Non-impact 
 
   12% 
  (118) 
 
 
Favor Individual 
 
Favor Government 
 
Pro-Individual Non-
impact 
  
   33% 
  (316) 
 
 
Favor Individual 
 
Favor Individual 
 
Pro-Individual 
Impact 
 
     8% 
    (73) 
 
 
Total 
 
 
------ 
 
------ 
 
  100% 
  (959) 
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Table 3.  Impact in the States.  This table shows the wide variation in treatment of 
Supreme Court progeny across the states. 
 
State Name Pro-State 
Impact 
Pro-Individual 
Impact 
Pro-State 
Non-impact 
Pro-Individual 
Non-impact 
Number of 
Progeny 
Alaska 0% 0% 0% 100% 1 
Alabama 64% 0% 9% 27% 11 
Arkansas 63% 0% 8% 29% 24 
Arizona 67% 8% 8% 17% 12 
California 33% 12% 12% 42% 33 
Colorado 32% 16% 10% 42% 50 
Connecticut 47% 11% 19% 23% 47 
Delaware 67% 4% 8% 21% 24 
Florida 43% 9% 5% 43% 21 
Georgia 40% 0% 10% 50% 10 
Hawaii 0% 11% 11% 78% 9 
Iowa 81% 6% 0% 13% 16 
Idaho 40% 5% 30% 25% 20 
Illinois 50% 9% 9% 32% 22 
Indiana 37% 10% 21% 32% 19 
Kansas 65% 6% 6% 23% 17 
Kentucky 67% 0% 0% 33% 6 
Louisiana 50% 6% 13% 31% 16 
Massachusetts 51% 3% 14% 32% 37 
Maryland 46% 8% 0% 46% 24 
Maine 69% 6% 13% 13% 16 
Michigan 46% 8% 8% 38% 13 
Minnesota 40% 10% 33% 17% 30 
Missouri 53% 10% 5% 32% 19 
Mississippi 65% 8% 4% 23% 26 
Montana 65% 0% 5% 30% 20 
North Carolina 57% 0% 0% 43% 21 
North Dakota 45% 9% 0% 45% 22 
Nebraska 46% 6% 26% 23% 35 
New Hampshire 32% 5% 26% 37% 19 
New Jersey 40% 13% 13% 33% 15 
New Mexico 14% 0% 43% 43% 7 
Nevada 80% 20% 0% 0% 5 
New York 35% 15% 8% 42% 26 
Ohio 57% 0% 14% 29% 14 
Oklahoma 41% 18% 18% 23% 17 
Oregon 60% 0% 13% 27% 15 
Pennsylvania 23% 4% 4% 69% 26 
Rhode Island 47% 12% 12% 29% 17 
South Carolina 50% 17% 0% 33% 6 
South Dakota 44% 0% 33% 22% 9 
Tennessee 14% 0% 14% 71% 7 
Texas 38% 10% 8% 44% 39 
Utah 40% 13% 7% 40% 15 
Virginia 50% 20% 20% 10% 10 
Vermont 60% 0% 13% 27% 15 
Washington 44% 11% 22% 22% 18 
Wisconsin 70% 0% 17% 13% 23 
West Virginia 28% 11% 6% 56% 18 
Wyoming 53% 0% 18% 29% 17 
Total 47% 8% 12% 33% 959 
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Table 4.  Models of State Judicial Decision-Making Across Institutional Contexts.  
These logit coefficients show the effect of political and legal variables on state judicial 
decisions across the three types of selection systems used in American states. 
Elite Selection Competitive Election Merit Retention 
Election 
 
Independent Variables 
β Std. error β Std. error β Std. error 
 
Search & Seizure Case Facts 
 
Median State Court PAJID 
 
Supreme Court Decision Direction 
 
Salience 
 
Frequency of Reversal 
 
Reversal * SCDD 
 
Constant 
 
 
0.62 
 
0.00 
 
0.14 
 
0.04 
 
-0.23 
 
0.04 
 
-1.54 
 
0.17*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.33 
 
0.03 
 
0.06*** 
 
0.09 
 
0.65** 
 
0.28 
 
-0.01 
 
-1.20 
 
0.01 
 
-0.31 
 
0.30 
 
0.90 
 
0.15** 
 
0.01 
 
0.41*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.09*** 
 
0.10*** 
 
0.50* 
 
0.40 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.91 
 
0.02 
 
-0.61 
 
0.72 
 
0.35 
 
0.18** 
 
0.01** 
 
0.61 
 
0.02 
 
0.25** 
 
0.25*** 
 
0.81 
 
N 
Pseudo-R2 
Likelihood χ2 
Log Likelihood 
 
 
   186 
       0.10 
     89.24*** 
  -111.47 
 
    389 
        0.04 
      22.74** 
   -252.82 
 
179 
0.06 
140.39*** 
115.30 
***p<.01, two-tailed test **p<.05, two-tailed test *p<.10, two-tailed test 
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Figure 1.  Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction 
of Supreme Court Precedent in Elite Selection Systems. 
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Figure 2.  Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction 
of Supreme Court Precedent in Competitive Electoral Systems. 
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Figure 3.  Impact of Frequency of Reversal, State Court Ideology, and the Direction 
of Supreme Court Precedent in Retention Systems. 
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Figure 4. Impact of Case Facts, Frequency of Reversal, and State Judicial 
Institutions for Liberal Supreme Court Precedent. 
 
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0 2 4 6
0 2 4 6
Elite Selection Competitive Election
Retention Election
No Recent Reversals 3 Recent Reversals
P
ro
ba
bi
lit
y 
th
at
 S
ta
te
 W
in
s
Case Facts Identified in Supreme Court Precedent
Graphs by Type of Selection System
 
 
  36
Appendix A  
Sampling State Supreme Court Progeny 
 Sampling Procedure.  The unit of analysis in our dataset is state supreme court 
progeny.  To gather these data, we developed a three step process for identifying a 
representative sample of state supreme court progeny.  First, we compiled a list of all 
orally-argued search and seizure cases that were decided upon the by Supreme Court 
from 1983-1993.  We developed this list using the issue area codes and United States 
Identification Numbers in the United States Supreme Court Database.  The temporal 
restriction is somewhat arbitrary, but was necessary in order to make our data collection 
effort manageable.  This produced a list of sixty three different Supreme Court cases.   
 The second step was to Shepardize these Supreme Court cases.14  This generated a list 
that contained 4859 state supreme court decisions extending from 1983 to April 2002.  
Because the ideology scores for state justices only extends to 1995 (Brace, Langer, and 
Hall 2000), we dropped all state progeny decided after 1995.  Eliminating these cases left 
us with a sampling frame of state citations with 3339 observations.  Each Supreme Court 
case yielded an average of 53 progeny, though there was a fair amount of diversity in the 
distribution (s2 = 84.6) and the distribution is fairly skewed (median = 30).   
 The third step was to draw a random number to each of these progeny.  We did this 
by assigning each observation a unique number from a uniform distribution that ranged 
from zero to one, with mean equal to .5.  We then ordered the cases according to their 
randomly assigned number and drew the first sixteen percent for our sample.15  This 
yielded a sample of 1020 cases.  For each of these progeny, we collected data on the 
independent and dependent variables described in the paper.  After accounting for a 
                                                 
15 Note that this is a “sampling without replacement” procedure. 
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previously unidentified error in the sampling frame (a Supreme Court case decided prior 
to 1983 slipped into our frame) and missing data, we were left with an effective sample 
of approximately 974 observations.   
 Progeny Sample Quality.  To assess the quality of our sample, we engaged in some 
post-hoc examination of the data.  First, if our procedure produced an accurate 
representation of search and seizure progeny, we expected to find that the state supreme 
court cases would typically involve cases in which one actors was a governmental actor 
and the other was an individual.  This was true in all but eight of the progeny (1.6-percent 
of the effective sample).  In these eight cases, the disputes were between two different 
individuals and typically involved a property dispute of some type.   
 If the sampling procedure was successful at producing a random sample, we also 
expected that the percentage of cases by state would be roughly equal in both the 
sampling frame and the eventual sample (i.e., not the effective sample).  Figure A1 shows 
that the number of cases per state varies considerably, as would be expected given the 
substantial differences in state judicial culture and behavior.  But we are more interested 
in whether these numbers correspond in a sensible manner to the proportion of cases by 
state in the sampling frame. 
[Figure A1 about here] 
 We examined this by aggregating the number of cases in both the sampling frame and 
sample to the state level.  We then computed a regression in which the percentage of state 
cases in the sampling frame was used to predict the number of cases in the sample.  If the 
sampling procedure was accurate, we would expect the regression line to have an 
intercept of zero and a slope of .16, because we randomly drew sixteen percent of the 
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frame for our sample.  Figure A2 shows a scatterplot of the number of cases in the 
sampling frame on the number of cases in the sample, with an actual regression estimate 
and a line representing a perfectly representative and random sample.  According to this 
graph, our sampling procedure slightly underrepresented states that had the most number 
of cases in the sampling frame because the actual regression line is shallower than the 
random sample line.  At the same time, the slope estimate (β* = .14) is remarkably 
similar to the random sample slope (β=.16).  And, while there may be some slight 
heteroskedasticity in the real regression estimate, the actual observations are clustered 
quite closely around the line.  This suggests that the number of cases per state in the 
sampling frame is quite similar to the number in the sample, suggesting a high degree of 
representativeness across states.   
[Figure A2 about here] 
 As a final check on the quality of our sample, we wanted to ascertain whether we 
might have to account for a sample selection bias in the dependent variable.  In other 
words, we decided it was important to determine whether or not there was correlation 
between the dependent variable and the cases in the sample.  Since we only have 
information on the dependent variable for our sample, we can only determine whether 
this correlation exists for the sample data.  If there was no sample selection problem, we 
expected that there would be no relationship between the number of cases in a sample 
and the percentage of cases within each state that complied with Supreme Court 
precedent (we collapsed the two types of noncompliance).  Figure A3 shows a scatterplot 
of the number of cases in the sample and the percent of noncompliance in each state.  As 
this display clearly demonstrates, there is a negligible relationship between these two 
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variables.  This implies that the sample is not biased by having cases from states that 
exhibit abnormally high or low patterns of noncompliance.   
[Figure A3 about here] 
 Based on these analyses, we concluded that we did not draw an odd sample and that, 
in fact, the sample was a reasonable representation of the universe of cases in our 
sampling frame. 
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Figure A1.  Progeny Per State.  This depicts the number of state supreme court progeny 
in each state in the sample.  It demonstrates a high level of variation between the states. 
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Figure A2.  Number of Cases Per State in the Sample versus the Sampling Frame.  
This graph plots the number of state supreme court progeny in each state that were in the 
sampling frame against the number of progeny per state in the sample.  The dotted line 
shows the predicted regression equation for a successful random sample, with intercept 
equal to zero and slope equal to .16.  The solid line runs more shallow than that, showing 
that our sample slightly over-represents those states that cite Supreme Court precedent 
less frequently. 
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Figure A3.  Number of Cases Per State in the Sample and State Supreme Court 
Consistency.  This graph plots the number of state supreme court progeny in each state 
that were in the sample as a function of state disagreement with the cited Supreme Court.  
This graph shows that the sample cases are not dependent on the extent to which state 
higher court decisions are consistent with the U.S. Supreme Court.  
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Appendix B.  Impact of Case Facts, Frequency of Reversal, and State Judicial 
Institutions for Conservative Supreme Court Precedent. 
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Endnotes 
                                                 
1 463 US 1032, 1983. 
2 We can borrow an analogy from the bureaucracy literature to help make this point.  In elite systems, 
monitoring is closer to “police patrols” where the elites monitor the courts with some regularity.  By 
contrast, electoral systems are more of a “fire alarm” system where the monitors – in this case the public – 
pay closer attention when problems arise. 
3 These data were collected from “The Original United States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 1953-2005 
Terms” compiled by Harold Spaeth (2007). 
4 See Appendix A for full details. 
5 We consider the citation string the number of cases that are cited by the progeny as a group.  Opinions 
will often discuss particular legal issues and conclude the paragraph with reference to a number of cases.  
We consider that if the state supreme court were to include the Supreme Court precedent in question in a 
citation string to be an effort to “hide” the cite from scrutiny in a potential effort to skirt that holding while 
at the same time attempting to raise any red flags that might lead to review and a reversal. 
6 The seven case facts are whether 1.) the search occurred in a home, 2.) the search occurred in a business, 
3.) the search occurred in a car, 4.) the search occurred on a person, 5.) it was a full search, 6.) the search 
occurred after a warrant at been issued, and 7.) the trial court had determined the presence of probable 
cause.  Although Segal (1984) enters these into his model separately, we find no differences in our key 
findings if we enter them as an index. 
7 As noted, there is a shift to the right in the political preferences of the Supreme Court.  The analyses we 
present below do not change when accounting for this shift. 
8 The PAJID scores are measures of individual justices’ political preferences.  Our hypotheses, however, 
are about where the state courts stand in general since opinions are arrived at by all justices on the state 
courts.  The traditional approach to dealing with this problem, which we employ here, is to use the median 
justice’s score as a measure of the “swing point” on the court. 
9 We are grateful to Laura Langer for generously sharing these data. 
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10 This might be more accurately stated as there is a tendency in the electoral systems toward distinguishing 
themselves from cited Supreme Court precedent in these systems when they haven’t been reversed 
frequently. 
11 In determining the impact of frequency of reversal, we controlled both the number of reversals and the 
value of interaction coefficient so that they both reflect their real values.  For example, when the cited 
precedent is liberal, the interaction variable is zero.  When it is conservative, it is equal to the value of the 
frequency of reversal. 
12 For purposes of these simulations, we define these as the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the PAJID 
variable. 
13 We have also calculated the substantive effect of case facts in cases citing conservative Supreme Court 
precedent and the results are quite similar.  These results are contained in Appendix B. 
